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Abstract
In a recent issue of Operating System Review, Hayter and McAuley [1991] argue that fu-
ture high-performance systems trade a traditional, bus-based organization for one where all
components are linked together by network switches (the Desk-Area Network). In this is-
sue of Operating System Review, Leslie, McAuley and Mullender conclude that DAN-based
architectures allow the exploitation of shared memory on a wider scale than just a single
(multi)processor. In this paper, we will explore how emerging 64-bit processors can be used
to implement shared address spaces spanning multiple machines.
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1 Introduction
In a recent issue of Operating System Review, Hayter and McAuley [1991] argue
that future high-performance systems trade a traditional, bus-based organization for
one where all components are linked together by network switches (the Desk-Area
Network). In this issue of Operating System Review, Leslie, McAuley and Mullender
conclude that DAN-based architectures allow the exploitation of shared memory on
a wider scale than just a single (multi)processor. In this paper, we will explore how
emerging 64-bit processors can be used to implement shared address spaces spanning
multiple machines.
The major problem of information sharing is this: For processes to share some
information, they have to agree upon what to share, i.e. they have to agree upon
the name of that information. From the performance point of view, the most efficient
naming scheme is, of course, the use of memory addresses: A pointer in memory can
be dereferenced in only one machine instruction; parsing of any other kind of name
— especially a string-based one — is far more expensive. In virtually all of today’s
systems naming schemes based on memory addresses can be only used by threads
in one address space, or processes sharing a memory segment and running on one
machine. Apart from any other considerations, the inability to share addresses more
widely is motivated by the fact that with current 32-bit architectures the size of the
address space is not large enough to encompass multiple processes and multiple ma-
chines. Therefore, pointers crossing machine boundaries must always be translated
to some other sort of name.
An approach that seems promising is the use of the emerging 64-bit address spaces
(e.g., the DEC Alpha architecture, or the MIPS R-4000 architecure). The huge size of
the virtual address space of these new architectures now allows designing systems
in which an address space can be shared across a set of machines having the same
architecture. In such a system it would be possible to have processes able to name
objects by means of their addresses, even if they were running on different machines.
Wide-address-space architectures may thus strongly reduce the performance prob-
lems related to marshalling and naming, which potentially make them a platform
for supporting information sharing much more efficiently. In the rest of this docu-
ment, we will discuss the issues raised by these new architectures, and we will try to
highlight the corresponding problems.
2 Shared Wide-Address Spaces
2.1 Scale of the Address Space
Sharing an address space among processes running on the same machine provides
by itself some potential for better performance [Bershad et al., 1991; Koldinger et
al., 1992]. According to the previous section, however, far bigger advantages should
come by sharing an address space across multiple machines. The question that arises
is deciding the size and kind of the group of machines sharing the address space.
Obviously, a major requirement is that they must be of the same architecture, other-
wise there would be no point in exchanging pointers among processes running on
different machines, and the contents of each piece of shared memory would have to
be repeatedly marshalled and unmarshalled.
Assuming, thus, that an address space is shared among a group of like machines,
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the problem turns into defining how big that group can be, and how much its compo-
nents can be physically dispersed. The number of machines that can share an address
space is basically limited by the fact that even in a 64-bit space, virtual addresses do
not completely come for free: If ten machines create objects at a rate of a ten giga-
bytes a minute, the address space will last 300 years, but if ten-thousand or a million
machines do it, the address space is used up rather quickly. Therefore, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that an address space will be shared by a few tens of machines
at most. About the physical distribution of those machines, problems of trust arise:
Addresses are a shared resource in a shared address space. Processes must be able to
count on certain objects to be reachable at certain addresses. If a number of machines
manage an address space together efficiently, they must trust each other to respect
the allocation policies for virtual addresses.
To sum up, it seems reasonable to assume that an address space will be shared
across a small, local group of like machines. The physical memory of each machine
will act as a cache for this shared address space, under control of the local kernel.
2.2 Persistence of the Address Space
Another issue, somewhat independent from the facilitation of information sharing,
that wide-address-space architectures make worth exploring, is that of the lifetime of
an address space. In today’s systems, an address space is associated with a process.
The lifetime of an address space is the same as the lifetime of the corresponding
process: They are created and cease to exist together. In today’s systems virtual ad-
dresses have to be heavily reused, i.e., their number is not enough for an address
space to outlive the lifetime of even a single process. With 64-bit architectures that
fundamental constraint is removed, and it becomes possible to start designing sys-
tems in which an address spaces is long lived in that it may even outlive the uptime
of individual machines. The basic idea here is that of backing up on secondary stor-
age information about the layout of the address space — which segment is mapped
at which address — together with the actual contents of “segments” in the form of
“files”.
The interesting issue is to define precisely what “long-lived” means, and from this
point of view several design choices are possible. One possibility is that every object
is given a range of addresses at creation time that lasts for its whole lifetime. Another
possibility is that of focusing on the validity of pointers. For instance, the system could
guarantee that once a pointer has been assigned the memory address of an object, this
pointer will remain valid until the pointed-to object is deleted. Alternatively, objects
can be deleted automatically when no pointers to them exist anymore. This will
require a garbage-collection mechanism. Note that when a segment is deleted that is
pointed-to from other segments, the system must guarantee that when attempting to
dereference those pointers, these will be recognized as being invalid. This complicates
the reuse of virtual addresses — if the system needs to.
If address spaces are long lived and objects keep their address for their lifetime,
objects containing internal pointers and pointers to other objects can be stored directly
in secondary storage — when they are retrieved they are retrieved to the same virtual
address (so internal pointers will keep their meaning) and pointers to other objects
will still be valid.
If, contrariwise, objects are stored on secondary storage in marshalled form (which
would be useful in any case when objects are shared across address-space bound-
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aries), the need for permanence of object addresses can be somewhat relaxed. Ap-
plications must “attach” an object explicitly before it uses pointers to or into it, and
“detach” it when it no longer uses those pointers.
2.3 Access to the Address Space
The fact that all processes see the same address space obviously does not imply that
they all have equal access to it: Segments have to be associated with a set of protec-
tion attributes — read, write, execute — separately mantained per process or group
of processes. Differently stated, in such a system protection of memory must be man-
aged in a way independent from the virtual-to-physical mapping, unlike what hap-
pens in contemporary systems. Reflecting this separation of concerns at the hardware
level may also give substantial performance improvement [Koldinger et al., 1992]
 
.
When sharing an address space across multiple processes, virtual addresses form a
shared resource. If the address space encompasses also multiple machines, the shared
nature of virtual addresses raises some problems that usually are not present in tra-
ditional systems. For instance, allocation and deallocation of addresses must be per-
formed in a “consistent” way; that is, kernels of different machines must never create
different segments whose address ranges partly overlap, or map the same segment to
different addresses for different processes. Satisfying this requirement is not difficult,
however, and several efficient solutions may be devised.
What is really important about the shared nature of virtual addresses is that, when-
ever the kernel has to set up the virtual-to-physical mapping for a segment, it has to
fetch the necessary information from a trusted part of the system: A malicious entity
could reply to a request for the addresses associated with some segment

, by speci-
fying a range that overlaps with addresses already allocated to some other segment

; this would affect not only the processes using

, but also those using

. This prob-
lem of trust is perhaps the major one when attempting to associate the address space
with some notion of permanence (Section 3). Its most obvious implication is that a
user-level file server providing contents of a segment cannot decide on the address of
that segment.
2.4 Addressing Objects
Every address space needs to use some sort of names for segments. From this point of
view, there are widely differing possible design choices, especially regarding to how
an address space can utter names meaningful to other spaces. It is likely that such
names will be variable-length, human-readable strings. We also expect that they will
be hierarchically structured, which allows scaling of the name space to arbitrary size.
According to Section 1, what is interesting in a wide-address space about naming, is
exploring the possibility of using memory addresses as names. It is straightforward to
realize, however, that these cannot be the only names used by the system: A memory
address only has meaning in one address space.
Most importantly, addresses act as pure names to some extent [Needham, 1993].

Note, however, that the separation above can be implemented also on architectures conceived to
support the traditional notion of process as an entity associated with its own private address space.
From this point of view, what is needed is basically structuring the kernel in such a way that page
tables of all the processes running on a given machine are mantained identical with respect to the
virtual-to-physical mapping.
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Pure names only identify; they do not help one in finding where an object is. Accord-
ingly, we may reasonably assume that whenever a segment has to be located, it cannot
be named by means of its address, so another kind of name has to be used, for instance
the ones outlined above. We may thus devise a style of interaction between processes
and the system like the following: Before starting using a segment, a process has to
tell the system that is going to use that segment, and names it by means of a hierar-
chical name — we say that the segment is being attached to the process. That name
is used by the system to physically locate some administrative information about the
segment, including its virtual address and access rights and, most importantly, where
the contents of the segment are stored.
Another important consequence of the fact that addresses behave like pure names,
is that resolving an address fault is not obvious. Even without entering in too many
details about the possible structure of the kernel, we may think of a faulting address
as one that does not lie within any of the segments currently attached — in the sense
mentioned above — to the faulting process. Upon such a fault, the kernel would have
to figure out whether that address is really an invalid address, or one of a segment that
exists and is not currently attached to the process. In the latter case the actual contents
of the segment have to be located. That means that given an address, the system
must always be able to find out the hierarchical name of the segment containing
that address, if it exists. Differently stated, the system must have the capability of
performing a complete reverse mapping of the address space. Apart from the fact that
in a 64-bit address space this might be computationally expensive, the real problem
here is related to security. Namely, since tables for performing reverse mapping in
such a space are likely to be too large to be always kept in memory, we expect that
at least part of those tables will need to be stored on some secondary storage. Due
to the problems raised by the shared nature of virtual addresses (Section 2.3), for a
system to be able to do a reverse mapping of the address space, we thus expect that
the need of equipping that system with some trusted piece of secondary storage will
arise.
The problems raised by address fault resolution could be tackled by simply re-
moving the assumption of reverse mapping capability: Whenever a process takes a
fault on an address does not lie within any of the segments currently attached to it, the
system simply raises an exception. In this way, processes would know that segments
cannot be attached upon faults, therefore applications should have to be structured in
such a way that segments are attached before their actual use. This would probably
be reasonable, but it would make it much more difficult to think of an address as a
name: If process   passes a pointer to process   , there is no guarantee that that
pointer is meaningful to   , i.e. that it refers to a segment attached to   .
2.5 Sharing across Address Spaces and Secondary Storage
A wide-address-space architecture by itself, seems not to provide any feature that may
facilitate information sharing across processes running in different address spaces.
Both the performance bottlenecks identified in Section 1 cannot be circumvented:
Marshalling, because different spaces can be associated with different hardware ar-
chitectures; naming, because address spaces allocate addresses independently from
each other  . The same piece of information will be placed at different addresses in

This influences also marshalling, because the contents of a segment containing pointers would
have no meaning when crossing an address space boundary, even if the corresponding machines
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different address spaces.
Apart from any motivations dictated by performance, however, it would be inter-
esting to see whether wide-address-space architectures make it easier to share infor-
mation on secondary storage. Today’s applications have marshalling code that was
written explicitly by the programmer. Data is often stored in ASCII form and con-
verted to another form when read in (a file of integers, for instance). Although we
may reasonably assume to reproduce such a situation even in systems based on 64-bit
architectures, it would be nicer to achieve a tighter integration between the virtual
memory system and the secondary storage, i.e. to allow several address spaces to
think of a given “file” as of a temporarily inactive “segment”.
From this point of view, the problem is deciding on whether the secondary storage
has to be conceived as part of an address space or not. In the former case, files would
be basically dumped images of memory segments, i.e., they would contain data in the
format that is understood by the architecture of the machines composing the address
space; in the latter case files would be instead stored in a marshalled form. Hybrid
organizations are possible, for instance some files could be kept marshalled — text
files and those that can be always understood by the kernel itself — and some others
unmarshalled.
Given the technological trends concerning relative speeds of CPUs and disks, per-
formance hardly suffers from the overhead imposed by the marshalling/unmarshalling
process. The system itself would unavoidably become more complicated, however:
Whereas we can assume that the system is somehow able to understand the format
of a few basic segment “types”, definitely we cannot assume that the system knows
about the format of every segment. We have thus to devise an organization in which
the system may need to rely on some other entity to marshal/unmarshal the con-
tents of a given segment, for instance a process executing some code provided by
the entity that created that segment. On the other hand, if every address space had
its own secondary storage, marshalling would still be necessary for sharing across
address-space boundaries.
Supporting some notion of persistency makes things even more complicated. Apart
from the need of determining how pointers should be represented on secondary stor-
age, there is some additional complexity demanded of the naming system. For a “file”
to be thought of as a temporarily inactive “segment” that exists in several address
spaces under the same name, the naming system should be able to associate different
attributes — i.e. addresses — with the same name, depending on where the entity that
uttered that name lives. Furthermore, for scalability reasons those attributes cannot
be kept “all together”: If a file that has been created at the University of Twente is
being used all over the world, it makes no sense to give the University itself the re-
sponsibility for “remembering” the addresses associated with all the corresponding
copies in far-away address spaces.
3 Discussion
According to what has been discussed so far, the major issues raised by the emerging
64-bit architectures seem to be basically related to the problem of where to keep infor-
mation about virtual addresses: In the setting outlined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, virtual
addresses are a resource shared across multiple machines, therefore they have to be
had the same architecture.
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managed by fully trusted entities. This need may be present even in a shared address
space that does not have any notion of permanence: To support a complete reverse
mapping capability, it seems very likely that at least part of the corresponding data
structures will have to be swapped out, which make them potentially vulnerable to
several kinds of attack (Section 2.4). On the other hand, without such a capability
thinking of an address as a name becomes really difficult. Permanence makes things
only harder, the main problem being the fact that a user-level file server providing
contents of a segment cannot decide also on the address of that segment (Section 2.4).
Any security troubles related to virtual addresses would disappear by simply
associating some piece of trusted secondary storage with every address space. Although
quite reasonable, this is still a strong design choice, and it may thus be worth exploring
different solutions. An alternative approach to the design of a shared address space —
either permanent or not — is that of giving applications themselves the responsibility
for performing, in a sense, reverse mapping. Every process would know the names
of a set of segments — that may be called segment tables — containing mappings
between ranges of virtual addresses into segment names, for the parts of the address
space it may be interested in. Segment tables are created, modified and destroyed by
user processes, and are shared by co-operating processes. Whenever a process takes
an exception because of an address fault, it looks up in the segment tables attached
to it, to see whether it knows which is the segment containing the faulting address; if
it does, it can attach that segment and go on, otherwise it aborts execution. The key
point is that the system decides on addresses of segments without being constrained
at all by the contents of segment tables. Therefore, if a malicious server deliberately
modifies the contents of some tables, this would affect only the processes that trusted
that server enough to give it their tables, all the other processes would not have any
trouble.
To support some notion of permanence without any trusted secondary storage,
an alternative solution might be the use of certificates. A certificate is basically a
statement signed by a trusted authority that cannot be forged [Abadi et al., 1991].
In the setting of our interest, certificates might be associated with segments to keep
track of their addresses, and they would be signed by the authority in charge of the
address space. Certificates can be stored together with segments themselves, i.e., on
untrusted secondary storage: If a server attempted to maliciously modify a certificate,
the system would be always able to detect that and would not accept the proposed
mapping. The major disadvantage of certificates is of course performance, because
decrypting a certificate takes time.
To sum up, 64-bit architectures are potentially an application platform for improv-
ing performance of information sharing and for simplifying management of complex
data structures: In the former case, by using address spaces that can be shared across
multiple processes and machines (Section 2.1); in the latter, by associating an address
space with some notion of persistence (Section 2.2). However, 64-bit architectures
provide only the basic support for the possibilities above, namely a huge number of
virtual addresses. To figure out the best way to make use of these new architectures,
other major problems remain to be solved, which are ultimately related to the shared
nature of virtual addresses. Furthermore, permanence itself accounts for a great deal
of complication of the system, therefore looking for a satisfactory trade-off between
the possibilities above seems to be a fundamental issue.
Within the Pegasus   project at the University of Twente, the design now focuses

The Pegasus project of the Universities of Cambridge and Twente is partially supported by ESPRIT
6
on sharing 64-bit address spaces across local groups of like machines, naming (per-
manent) files by hierarchical names and associating (temporal) segments with files
through a so-called attach operation. If a file is multiply attached by different processes,
the system guarantees that all resulting segments share the same address range.
System-provided or user-defined segment servers marshal data between file and seg-
ment and have access to mechanisms for keeping copies of virtual segments in differ-
ent physical locations consistent. When the last process that has a segment attached
terminates, the segment can be cleaned up by its segment server and the address
range deallocated. The system does, however, guarantee not to reuse the address
range for a sufficiently long time.
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